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ABSTRACT Since digital instrumentation and control systems are expected to play an essential role
in safety systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs), the need to incorporate software failures into NPP
probabilistic risk assessment has arisen. Based on a Bayesian belief network (BBN) model developed to
estimate the number of software faults considering the software development lifecycle, we performed a
pilot study of software reliability quantification using the BBN model by aggregating different experts’
opinions. In this paper, we suggest the distribution-based node probability table (D-NPT) development
method which can efficiently represent diverse expert elicitation in the form of statistical distributions and
provides mathematical quantification scheme. Besides, the handbook data on U.S. software development and
V&V and testing results for two nuclear safety software were used for a Bayesian update of the D-NPTs in
order to reduce the BBN parameter uncertainty due to experts’ different background or levels of experience.
To analyze the effect of diverse expert opinions on the BBN parameter uncertainties, the sensitivity studies
were conducted by eliminating the significantly different NPT estimates among expert opinions. The
proposed approach demonstrates a framework that can effectively and systematically integrate different kinds
of available source information to quantify BBN NPTs for NPP software reliability assessment.
INDEX TERMS Bayesian belief network, nuclear power plant, probabilistic risk assessment, software
reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in nuclear
power plants (NPPs) have recently been replacedwith digital-
based systems, and the reason for this transition lies in the
critical functional advantages that digital systems offer over
conventional analog systems. However, the integration of the
risk model of a digital I&C system into NPP probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) model presents unique challenges since
digital I&C systems have different failure modes and causes,
such as software failure, compared to analog systems. Since
software failure can significantly affect the risk of digital
protection systems in NPPs [1], [2], software reliability must
be quantified to guarantee the safety of digitalized NPPs.
Regarding the quantification schemes of safety graded
software reliability, a previous study [3] has investigated a
spectrum of related methods and identified potential ones that
may serve to quantify software on-demand failure probabili-
ties of NPP digital systems, such that the system models can
be integrated into an NPP PRA model. Among the various
methods investigated in the previous study, a Bayesian belief
network (BBN)methodwas selected as one of the appropriate
candidates for the software reliability quantification of the
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digital protection systems. The BBN method is known as
a probabilistic graphical model depicting a set of random
variables and their conditional independence via a directed
acyclic graph, in which nodes represent random variables
with the acyclic graphs not forming any loops [4]. Since the
BBN method uses conditional probability tables to represent
interdependency among different events, it can potentially
combine qualitative information, such as quality in carrying
out software life cycle activities, with quantitative informa-
tion, such as software test and operational data.
In order to estimate the failure probability of theNPP safety
graded software and incorporate it into an NPP PRA model,
a Bayesian belief network (BBN) model was developed in
Kang et al. [5] which estimates the number of defects in
software programs considering the software development life
cycle (SDLC) characteristics. In the model, SDLC charac-
teristics such as the quality of software development and
verification and validation (V&V) activities, and software-
self characteristics such as program size and complexity, are
represented using a hierarchical structure. In order to quantify
the various node parameters modeled in the BBN structure,
node probability tables (NPTs) are used to contain probability
information based on the belief relationships between the
parent and child nodes in the model. The root nodes are
allocated with a prior distribution, and the others are allocated
with their conditional probability distributionswhere theNPT
represents all possible combinations of the parent states for
each child node. Since the developed BBN model focuses on
safety-related software, NPTs should represent the variability
among the class of safety-related software, and their values
need to be estimated using the operational data of safety
software. Generally, NPTs are derived through various meth-
ods such as direct expert judgment, estimation from datasets,
and representation using equations to specify the relationship
between nodes [6].
Due to a lack of sufficient data from the collection of a
safety-related software, previous BBN approaches that have
been performed in nuclear safety field including European
projects SERENE [7], IMPRESS [8], OECD Halden Reactor
project [9], [10], as well as Fenton and Neil [11], Littlewood
and Wright [12], and other literature [13]–[17], used expert
elicitation to cover quantitative aspects of the BBN model,
specifically to quantify the NPTs for the prior probability and
the conditional probability of BBN nodes given the state of its
parent nodes. In most studies on BBN modeling for software
reliability quantification, the NPTs in the BBN model were
constructed based on the probability tables composed of point
estimate or a single value entered by experts. However, a
potential limitation of using expert opinions to estimate the
quantities of NPTs specified in the BBN model with point
estimates comes from the diversity of the experts’ opinions.
Since multiple experts may provide widely diverse opin-
ions, those experts’ diverse elicitations should be treated in
an integrated manner when estimating NPTs for a specific
software development process. This variety in the experts’
opinions can be better caught in a probabilistic manner where
the uncertainty associated with specified NPTs can be repre-
sented by using the distribution of the experts’ opinions.
Therefore, in this paper, an integrated NPT quantification
method is proposed to develop the distribution-based NPT
(D-NPT) by aggregating diverse expert opinions and other
sources of evidence for the quantification of NPTs in the
BBN model. The D-NPTs were used to represent the uncer-
tainty associated with the NPTs for the BBN nodes in this
study instead of using discretized point estimates, initially
given by each expert, to account for the variability among
NPP safety-related software based on the different experts’
answers on the BBN model parameter estimates. The variety
of the answers from the experts were aggregated and used to
derive the probability distributions which gives the best-fit for
the overall data points given by experts for each node in the
BBN model. The elicitations were conducted by distributing
background material and questionnaires to experts, collecting
and analyzing the provided answers, resolving the provided
comments. The questionnaire and the answers the experts
provided are included in the authors’ previous report [18].
Since experts have different levels of knowledge on nuclear
safety-related software or there is a variation in the quality
or error sources of software used in different organizations,
a large diversity of opinions can be observed for some nodes
in the BBN model. Therefore, available literature data and
software development data, such as handbook data on U.S.
software development and V&V as well as the testing results
for two trial nuclear safety software, were used to Bayesian
update the D-NPTs in the BBN model to reduce the BBN
parameter uncertainties. Also, sensitivity studies were under-
taken to analyze the effect of the elimination of expert esti-
mates that are significantly different from the other estimates
on the BBN parameter uncertainties.
II. APPLICATION OF DISTRIBUTED NODE PROBABILITIES
IN BBN MODEL QUANTIFICATION
Figs. 1 and 2 depict the high-level BBN structure of the
Design phase during software development process and a
detailed structure of the ‘‘Development quality in Design
phase’’ node, respectively, which are developed in authors’
previous research [5]. In Fig. 1, the dashed grey rectangle
nodes denote the NPTs of ‘‘Defect density’’ and ‘‘Defect
detection probability’’ nodes that are estimated by expert elic-
itation. The dashed grey circle nodes denote the root nodes
of the model. The nodes ‘‘Development quality’’ and ‘‘V&V
quality’’ in the model are not directly observable in most
software development life cycles, which make data collection
challenging. Therefore, in this study, an expert opinion elici-
tation was performed to estimate a prior distribution for those
quality nodes. Similarly, the ‘‘Size and Complexity’’ node
was initially estimated in the elicitation, and then a constant
value can be used when applied to a specific nuclear safety
software. As shown in Fig. 2, various indicators (attribute
nodes) were identified and developed to provide indirect
indications for these quality nodes. The white rectangle nodes
in Fig. 2 are the attribute nodes whose NPTs were estimated
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FIGURE 1. BBN model for software design phase – the relationship of expert elicitation to the BBN nodes.
FIGURE 2. BBN model for software design phase – expert elicitation on
the attributes nodes for the development quality in design phase.
by expert elicitation which can be replaced with observed
evidence from a specific nuclear safety software. The expert
elicitation conducted as a part of BBN model construction
covers the quantitative aspects of the model as follows: 1) the
NPTs of the prior distributions of parent nodes (e.g., the prior
distributions for the development and V&V quality nodes,
shown in Fig. 1); 2) the conditional distribution of child nodes
given the state of parent nodes (e.g., probability distribution
of the quality of the attribute nodes given the quality of the
nodes ‘‘Development quality’’ or ‘‘V&V quality’’, shown
in Fig. 2).
The BBN parameters were answered as either point esti-
mates or three percentile estimates (5th, 50th, and 95th
percentile) by the experts. The nodes elicited by the 5th,
50th, and 95th percentile estimates include: 1) the node
‘‘number of defects introduced’’; 2) the node ‘‘probability of
defect removal introduced in current phase’’; and 3) the node
‘‘probability of defect removal passed from the previous
phase.’’ As shown in Fig. 1, the expert elicitation on those
nodes are the conditional probabilities given either develop-
ment or V&V quality in that SDLC phase. The nodes elicited
by the point estimate include: 1) the node ‘‘Development
quality’’; 2) the node ‘‘V&V quality; 3) the node ‘‘number
of function points (FPs),’’ and 4) the attribute nodes.
A potential limitation of using expert opinions to estimate
the quantities of NPTs in the BBN model comes from the
disparity in the experts’ opinions. That is, multiple experts
may provide widely diverse answers, which should be treated
in an integrated manner when estimating the NPTs in order
to account for BBN parameter uncertainty representing the
variability among the population of safety-related software.
This variety of the experts’ opinions must be modeled in a
probabilistic manner; therefore, in this study, the variance
associated with specified NPTs was represented as the tables
of probabilistic distributions (D-NPT) based on experts’
answers on BBN nodes instead of discretized estimates to
account for BBN parameter uncertainty.
In this study, the distributions which gave the best-fit for
the empirical distribution generated by combining different
experts’ opinions were used to define each value of the NPTs
in each BBN node, thus, represent the uncertainty associated
with the NPTs for the nodes subject to expert elicitation. The
BBN parameters including the number of defects inserted or
removed in each SDLC phase are estimated. Fig. 3 shows
a flowchart of the D-NPT development processes and BBN
model quantification using D-NPT. In this process, con-
tinuous univariate distributions (Gamma, Logistic, Lognor-
mal, Normal, Weibull, Beta, and Pareto distributions) were
employed to fit the empirical distribution obtained from the
data provided by the expert opinion by using the distribution-
fitting techniques provided by ALLFITDIST toolkit [19].
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FIGURE 3. An overall scheme of D-NPT development and its implementation to BBN model.
TABLE 1. An example of expert elicitation: The prior distribution for complexity states of safety-related software.
When deriving the D-NPTs of the nodes whose estimates are
given as the point values by the experts, the best distribution
fit was derived based on the point estimates given by the
experts. For the nodes whose estimates were answered as
three percentile values (5th, 50th, and 95th percentile), the
best-fit distribution was derived by generating an empirical
distribution by sampling from experts’ elicitations. When
finding the probability distribution which best represents
the data, Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) measures were used [20]. Since
low values for estimated AIC and BIC imply a low expected
information loss, the distribution model with the lower value
of AIC and BIC was used for D-NPT development by fitting
the distribution to the data points provided by the experts [21].
A. D-NPT OF THE BBN NODES ELICITED BY
POINT ESTIMATE
As a part of expert elicitation, BBN parameters such as
the prior distribution for quality nodes, the number of FPs,
and the conditional probability distribution for the attributes,
were elicited as point estimates. For example, regarding the
number of FPs used in calculating the defect density and the
defect detection probability, point estimates were given by
the experts for the probabilities of its three complexity states
(Low for FP ≤ 100,Medium for 100 ≤ FP ≤ 1000, andHigh
for 1000 ≤ FP ≤ 1500), as shown in Table 1. In this study,
these different point estimates given by the experts were
assumed to account for the variabilities among the safety-
related software population; therefore, the probability distri-
butions were used for the NPTs in the BBN model instead of
using point values. In this process, the best distribution fit for
prior distribution was analyzed based on the point estimates
given as expert opinions over each defined state. In case of
the prior distribution for the ‘‘Number of FPs’’ node, Beta
distribution was used to represent expert opinion diversity
associated with the number of FPs since it showed the lowest
AIC and BIC values for most of the data sets. Note that other
BBN nodes elicited by the experts as point estimates can
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TABLE 2. Description of the D-NPTs estimated based on expert point estimates.
also be represented using probability distributions in the same
manner. Table 2 shows the estimated D-NPTs of the BBN
nodes elicited by experts as a point estimate.
B. D-NPT OF THE BBN NODES ELICITED BY
PERCENTILE ESTIMATE
While experts were asked to provide the point estimates for
the NPTs of some nodes, the discretized probability estimates
(i.e., 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile estimates) were asked
to experts for other BBN nodes such as defect density (the
number of defects per FP) and defect detection probability.
For example, one expert gave low defect detection probability
with high variance, e.g., 0.47, 0.68, and 0.89, while other
expert estimated high detection probability with low variance,
e.g., 0.82, 0.87, and 0.92, for the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile
estimates respectively, for the detection probability of the
defects introduced in current phase at given Medium V&V
quality and Low complexity in the Requirements phase as
shown in Table 3. In this study, these discrepancies in expert
opinion were accounted for the BBN parameter uncertainty
representing a population of generic safety-related software,
and three requested percentiles were aggregated and further
converted to a probability distribution.
TABLE 3. An example of expert elicitation: Conditional NPT for
‘‘detection probability for defects introduced in current phase’’
node in requirement phase.
For theD-NPTs of ‘‘Defect density’’ and ‘‘Defect detection
probability’’ nodes, a Normal distribution was used to fit the
5th, 50th, and 95th percentile estimate given by each expert
and a Monte Carlo simulation was then used to generate
an empirical distribution by sampling and aggregating the
Normal distributions estimated from each expert’s elicitation.
In the process, the samples from the Normal distributions
with values lower than 0 were truncated in case of the defect
density defined in [0,∞]. Similarly, for the defect detection
probability, the samples whose values fall outside the [0, 1]
interval were also truncated.
As a result of deriving the probability distributions defined
for BBN NPTs, Gamma and Beta distributions showed the
lowest AIC and BIC values for most of the data sets in case
of the defect density and the defect detection probability,
respectively, and were used to represent the BBN param-
eter uncertainty in the model. For example, Fig. 4 shows
the cumulative distribution function of the fitted distribution
based on expert percentile estimations on the defect detection
probability at current phase at given Medium V&V quality
and Low complexity in the Requirements phase. The col-
ored dotted lines indicate the fitted normal distribution from
each expert elicitation, and the marker indicates the expert
percentile estimations on the defect detection probability
at current phase. The black line indicates the fitted Beta
FIGURE 4. Treatment of expert opinion diversity for ‘‘Detection probability
for defects introduced in current phase’’ node in requirement phase.
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TABLE 4. Description of the D-NPTs estimated based on expert percentile estimates.
distribution representing the probability distribution consid-
ering all expert elicitation on defect detection probability.
Table 4 shows the summary of the estimated D-NPTs for the
BBN nodes elicited by percentile estimates.
III. BAYESIAN UPDATE OF THE DISTRIBUTED NODE
PROBABILITIES IN BBN MODEL USING
REFERENCE DATA
Considering that experts have different levels of knowledge
and experience with nuclear safety-related software, this may
lead to significant diversity in the BBNNPT elicitation, and a
large variance in the node probability values can be observed
for some BBN nodes. One of the critical features of the devel-
oped BBN model is that when the evidence for a BBN node
is observed from the literature or the field experience data,
the NPTs can be updated from the available evidence data
based on the Bayesian update method considering the conju-
gate prior family of probability distributions [22]. Although
Bayes’ theorem, as shown in Eq. 1, is mathematically simple,
practical difficulties of its implementation lie in deriving the
normalizing constant, the denominator in Eq. 1 [23]. Here,
the product of the prior P(ϑ) and likelihood function P(x|ϑ)
must be integrated over the domain of the parameters ϑ being
estimated.
P (ϑ |x) = P (ϑ)P (x|ϑ)∫
P (ϑ)P (x|ϑ) dϑ (1)
In Bayes’ theorem, if the posterior distributions P(ϑ |x) are
in the same family as the prior probability distribution P(ϑ),
the prior and posterior are then called conjugate distributions,
and the prior is called the conjugate prior for the likelihood
function. For example, consider a random variable which
consists of the number of successes in n Bernoulli trials with
unknown probability of success q in [0, 1]. This random vari-
able will follow the Binomial distribution, with a probability
mass function that can be expressed as a function of q, having
the form for the parameters a and b, as in Eq. 2.
p (x) =
(n
x
)
qx (1− q)x ∝ qa (1− q)b (2)
Considering the Beta distribution, which is a conjugate
prior for the Bernoulli likelihood, the prior distribution can
be derived as follows:
p (q) = q
α−1 (1− q)β−1
B (α, β)
(3)
where α and β are chosen to reflect any existing belief
or information and q is the parameters of the underlying
model. In this context, α and β are called prior hyperparam-
eters (parameters of the prior). Considering that we sample
a random variable q, and get s successes and f failures, the
posterior distribution, P(q = x|s, f ), and its hyperparameters
can be derived as follows:
P (s, f |q = x) =
(n
s
)
xs (1− x)f (4)
P (x) = x
α−1 (1− x)β−1
B (α, β)
(5)
P (q=x|s, f )= P (x)P(s, f |x)∫
P (x)P(s, f |x)dx =
xs+α−1 (1−x)f+β−1
B (s+α, f +β)
(6)
where the posterior is formulated as a Beta distribution
with parameters (s+α, f +β). Then this posterior distribution
can be used as the prior for more samples, with the hyperpa-
rameters adding further information as it is introduced.
In this study, handbook data on U.S. software develop-
ments and V&V experience as well as the testing result from
the development experience of two application systems on the
software defect potentials and defect removal efficiency were
used as the evidence for the ‘‘Defect density’’ and ‘‘Defect
detection probability for defects introduced in current phase’’
nodes in the BBN model and the D-NPTs were updated
accordingly.
A. BAYESIAN UPDATE OF THE BBN D-NPTS USING
EVIDENCE FROM HANDBOOK DATA
The handbook data on the U.S. software development and
V&V experience for the software defect potentials and the
defect removal efficiency [24] were utilized to Bayesian
update the D-NPTs estimated from the expert elicitation.
As previously discussed, a Gamma distribution estimated
from the expert elicitation was used to represent the D-NPTs
for ‘‘Defect density’’ node throughout each SDLC phase.
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In this analysis, it was assumed that the mean defect den-
sity was estimated in the expert elicitation process, and the
software defect potentials in the handbook data were treated
as observations, specifically Poisson likelihood mean. For
simplicity, the number of inserted defects was estimated from
the mean values of the Poisson process instead of sampling
from the Poisson distribution.
Table 5 shows important quality metrics such as defect
potentials and defect removal efficiency of various software
applications from the handbook data. In this study, it was
assumed that the ‘‘Capability maturity model (CMM)
Level 5 joined with Six Sigma’’ represents High devel-
opment or V&V quality, the ‘‘CMM Level 4’’ represents
Medium development or V&V quality, and the ‘‘Spiral’’
represents Low development or V&V quality. Since the infor-
mation was not available regarding how many cases were
analyzed to derive the defect potentials and their removal
efficiency in the reference, the number of observations was
assumed to be one for simplicity.
TABLE 5. Software types and defect characteristic [24].
The defect potential in Table 5 refers to the sum of possi-
ble errors in the software from five separate sources: errors
in requirements, errors in design, errors in source code,
errors in user documentation, and errors associated with bad
fixes or secondary errors introduced while fixing a primary
error. Table 6 lists the overall distribution of software errors
among the various categories of origin points across many
industry segments from the handbook data. For the Bayesian
update of the D-NPTs of the defect density nodes in the
BBN model, defect density evidence in each phase of the
SDLC was derived as the product of the defect potential
and defect origin percentage. Since the defect origin in the
installation phase was not reported, the software defect origin
for the Installation-and-Checkout phase was not included in
the Bayesian update of the D-NPT of defect density node
in the BBN model. The code bugs and bad fix bugs were
assumed to be defects from the Implementation and Test
TABLE 6. Software defect origin allocations [24].
phases, respectively. The document bugs were not considered
in this study. Based on the handbook data evidence, a Poisson
distribution was then used to represent the likelihood for the
defect density node (conjugate prior) derived from expert
elicitation represented as a Gamma distribution.
Regarding the D-NPT for ‘‘Defect detection probability
for defects introduced in current phase’’ node, the defect
removal efficiency reported in the handbook data shown
in Table 4 was used as the evidence for the Bayesian update.
Here, the defect removal efficiency refers to the percentage
of defects removed before the delivery of the software to its
users. In this study, the defect removal efficiency reported in
the reference was assumed to be the defect detection proba-
bility at each SDLC phase. In the analysis, the software defect
removal efficiency in the reference data was treated as an
observation, specifically the probability (p) of Bernoulli like-
lihood because the expert elicitation on the defect detection
probability corresponds to the distribution of p. Therefore,
Bernoulli distribution was used to represent the likelihood
for the ‘‘Defect detection probability for defects introduced in
current phase’’ node (conjugate prior), whichwas represented
with a Beta distribution derived from expert elicitation. In this
study, various software types reported in the handbook data
were assumed to have Medium complexity, and the posterior
hyperparameters of the Beta distribution for the High and
Low complexity cases were estimated by the ratio of themean
of the Beta distribution derived from expert elicitation for
High and Low complexity to that ofMedium complexity, as in
Eqs. 7-9.
(Updated Mean)i,j = (Updated Mean)M ,j ∗ γi,j (7)
(Updated Variance)i,j = (Variance)i,j ∗
(Updated Mean)i,j
(Mean)i,j
(8)
γi,j =
(Mean)i,j
(Mean)M ,j
(9)
where i represents the degree of complexity (H: High,
M: Medium, and L: Low) and j represents the degree of
V&V quality (H: High, M: Medium, and L: Low). Here,
(Mean) and (Variance) denote the mean and variance of the
prior Beta distribution derived from the expert elicitation,
and the (UpdatedMean) and (UpdatedVariance) denote the
mean and variance of the posterior Beta distribution updated
from the handbook data. By Bayesian updating, the D-NPT
for ‘‘Defect detection probability for defects introduced in
current phase’’ node with the handbook data, the posterior
hyperparameters of the Beta distribution for each V&V qual-
ity and complexity at each SDLC phase were estimated.
B. BAYESIAN UPDATE OF THE BBN D-NPTS USING
EVIDENCE FROM ANOMALY REPORT DATA OF NPP
SAFETY GRADED SOFTWARE
In addition to the handbook data on U.S. software develop-
ment experience, limited V&V and testing results available
for the development of two application systems, namely (1)
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the Loop Operating Control System (LOCS) of the Advanced
Test Reactor at Idaho National Laboratory [25] and (2) the
prototype Integrated Digital Protection System–Reactor Pro-
tection System (IDiPS-RPS) developed by KAERI [17], were
used for the Bayesian update of the D-NPT of ‘‘Defect den-
sity’’ node derived from expert opinions to further reduce
BBN parameter uncertainty.
Based on the defect estimates data reported in software
development anomaly reports of both systems, the defect den-
sity D-NPT in the BBNmodel was Bayesian updated consid-
ering the conjugate prior family of distributions. The defect
estimates in the anomaly reports for both applications were
assumed to be the number of defects detected in each SDLC
phase. Tables 7 and 8 show the defect estimates reported in
the IDiPS-RPS and LOCS anomaly reports, respectively. The
IDiPS-RPS composed of the software in four main processors
in each channel: bistable processor (BP), the coincidence
processor (CP), the automatic test and interface processor
(ATIP), and the cabinet operator module (COM). In case of
the IDiPS-RPS, the number of defects detected at the Test
phase was assumed to be the sum of defect estimates reported
in the Integration phase and Validation phase. The number
of defects in the Installation-and-Checkout phase was not
considered since IDiPS-RPS had not yet been installed; thus
the ‘‘Defect density’’ node was not updated with IDiPS-RPS
data. In the case of defect estimates for LOCS, the number
of anomaly reports was assumed to be the number of defects
detected at each SDLC phase.
TABLE 7. Defect estimates from the IDIPS-RPS anomaly report [17].
TABLE 8. LOCS defect estimates based on anomaly report [25].
Since the defect estimates in the anomaly reports of
IDiPS-RPS and LOCS were assumed to be the number of
defects detected in each SDLC phase, the number of defects
denoted as xj in Eq. 10 introduced in j SDLC phase can be as:
yi = xj ∗
(
Pj,H ∗ Vj,H + Pj,M ∗ Vj,M + Pj,L ∗ Vj,L
)
(10)
where yi is the defect estimates reported in both systems’
anomaly reports, Pj,i is the defect detection probability
at iV&Vquality in j SDLC phase, andVj,i is the posterior dis-
tribution for iV&Vquality in j SDLCphase. From the derived
number of defects at each SDLC phase (xj), the number of
defects for each development quality was derived using the
posterior distribution of development quality for IDiPS-RPS
and LOCS as shown in Eqs. 11-15.
xj = Nj,H ∗ Dj,H + Nj,M ∗ Dj,M + Nj,L ∗ Dj,L (11)
Nj,H = βj,H ,M ∗ Nj,M (12)
Nj,L = βj,L,M ∗ Nj,M (13)
βj,H ,M =
(Updated Mean)j,H
(Updated Mean)j,M
(14)
βj,L,M =
(Updated Mean)j,L
(Updated Mean)j,M
(15)
where xj is the number of defects in each SDLC phase
derived from Eq. 10, Nj,i is the mean number of defects at i
development quality in j SDLC phase, andDj,i is the posterior
distribution for i development quality in j SDLC phase. Here,
βj,H ,M is the ratio of the updated mean of High development
quality to that of Medium, and βj,L,M is the ratio of the
updatedmean of Low development quality to that ofMedium.
The defect density, or the number of defects per FP, for each
SDLC phase was derived by dividing the number of defects
by the number of FPs of the two trial systems: 56 and 41 for
IDiPS-RPS and LOCS, respectively.
C. BAYESIAN UPDATE RESULT OF THE BBN D-NPTS
USING REFERENCE DATA
In this study, both the handbook data and two application sys-
tems’ anomaly report data were treated as observations used
for the Bayesian update of the D-NPTs of ‘‘Defect density’’
node to reduce parameter uncertainty from the diverse expert
inputs. As a result of the Bayesian update using reference
data, the uncertainty regarding defect density D-NPTs can be
decreased considerably over all phases. Particularly, defect
density in the SDLC phases where a greater diversity in
expert estimations was observed showed a more significant
effect from the Bayesian update using both handbook and
anomaly data from the two trial systems. Further, the mean
of defect density decreased in all phases. As an example, for
the Test and Implementation phases, the mean decreased by
27.48% and 48.32%, and the standard deviation decreased
by 53.11% and 77.32%, respectively. Fig. 5-(a) shows the
updated results for defect density at given High development
quality in the Implementation and Test phases.
For the ‘‘Defect detection probability for defects intro-
duced in current phase’’ node, handbook data on the defect
removal efficiency of various software applications were
used in the Bayesian update to reduce parameter uncertainty.
Subsequently, the uncertainty regarding defect detection
probability node also decreased over all phases while the
mean of defect detection probability was slightly increased.
For example, for the Test and Implementation phases,
the mean increased by 0.54% and 3.05%, and the standard
deviation decreased by 2.52% and 10.30%, respectively.
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TABLE 9. BBN model parameters for all medium development and V&V quality.
FIGURE 5. Bayesian-updated D-NPTs – (a) ‘‘Defect density’’ D-NPT at
given high development quality, and (b) ‘‘Detection probability for defects
introduced in current phase’’ D-NPT at given medium complexity and
High V&V quality in implementation and test phases.
Fig. 5-(b) shows the updated result of defect detection proba-
bility at current phase at given Medium complexity and High
V&V quality in the Implementation and Test phases using
handbook data on U.S. software development experience.
IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR EXPERT ELICITATION
DIVERSITY ON THE BBN PARAMETERS
As previously discussed, different estimations can be given
by the experts for BBN parameters due to their different
backgrounds and levels of experience in managing and
developing safety-related software. This diversity can cause
large deviations in the application results as presented in
the authors’ previous study because all diverse estimations
given by experts were considered in quantifying BBN model
parameters, such defect density, and defect detection proba-
bility. Therefore, demonstrations were undertaken to observe
the effects of the elimination of expert estimations that are
significantly different from the estimations given by other
experts. In this study, sensitivity studies were performed for
the BBN parameters, such as the ‘‘Attributes,’’ ‘‘Defect den-
sity,’’ and ‘‘Defect detection probability’’ nodes. The sensitiv-
ity analysis results were then compared with the results of the
base case where it was assumed that all development quality
and V&V quality have Medium quality and the number of
FPs is 50. Table 9 shows the evaluation results when the
development and V&V quality in all phases have Medium
quality for the number of FPs of 50. The model was evaluated
usingWinBUGS [26], which usesMarkov chainMonte Carlo
to solve the Bayesian inference problem posed in the model.
A. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR ATTRIBUTE
The elicited expert opinions on the conditional probabilities
of an attribute for a given development quality or V&V
quality were estimated by point estimates. Two significantly
different estimations were selected by identifying the esti-
mations that were the furthest from the average of the esti-
mations and then excluded from the simulations. In result,
slight changes in the mean of both the number of defects
introduced and detected were caused by the exclusion of the
two most different estimations, as shown in Table 10. The
number of defects introduced in the current phase changed
by less than 1.83%. The probability of detecting the defects
introduced in the current phase and those passed from the
previous phase changed by less than 0.70% and 0.64%,
respectively. This is because the experts’ answers for the
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TABLE 10. The number of defects introduced in the current phase and defect detection probabilities following the exclusion of the two most significantly
different opinions on the attributes.
attribute conditional probabilities were relatively consistent,
and thus the diverse opinions in attributes did not have much
effect on the result.
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR DEFECT DENSITY
The node probability for defect density was given as 5th,
50th, and 95th percentile estimates with significant diversity
observed in the expert elicitation. As a sensitivity study,
distributions of the smaller variance were selected as the
experts’ opinions, whose 50th percentile estimation is the
furthest from the average of 50th percentile estimation from
all experts. Monte Carlo simulation was then used to gen-
erate an empirical distribution by sampling from the esti-
mated Normal distributions while excluding the two most
different estimations for each specified development quality.
Consequently, defect density, having more diverse estima-
tions than other BBN parameters, showed a larger effect from
excluding the significantly different estimations. Especially,
considerable differences were observed in the Test and
Installation-and-Checkout phases. As shown in Table 11,
the mean decreased by 21.33% and 59.18%, and the standard
deviation decreased by 12.26% and 35.78% in the Test and
Installation-and-Checkout phases, respectively.
TABLE 11. LOCS defect estimates based on anomaly report [25].
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR DETECTION PROBABILITY
OF DEFECTS INTRODUCED IN CURRENT PHASE
The experts’ opinions for the defect detection probability
were given as the estimated 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles.
The same approach of selecting the most significantly differ-
ent estimations of defect density was used for the sensitivity
study on the probability of detecting the defects in the cur-
rent phase. Monte Carlo simulation was used to generate an
empirical distribution by sampling from the estimated Nor-
mal distributions while excluding the two most significantly
different estimations for each specified V&V quality and
complexity. The estimations for the detection probability of
the defects introduced in the current phase showed a relatively
high consistency. As shown in Table 12, the detection prob-
abilities were changed by −1.13%, 1.85%, −1.42%, 1.33%,
and 1.29%, for the Requirements, Design, Implementation,
Test, and Installation-and-Checkout phases, respectively.
TABLE 12. Defect detection probability for the defects introduced in the
current phase excluding the two most significantly different opinions.
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR DETECTION PROBABILITY
FOR DEFECTS PASSED FROM PREVIOUS PHASE
In case of the detection probability of defects passed from
the previous phases, significant differences between the
expert opinions were observed when compared to those for
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the defects introduced in the current phase. Similar to the
previous sensitivity analysis, Monte Carlo simulation was
used to generate an empirical distribution by sampling from
the estimated Normal distributions while excluding the two
most significantly different estimations for each specified
V&V quality and complexity. In result, a larger change was
observed by excluding the two most significantly different
estimations compared to the case of detection probability of
defects introduced in current phase. As depicted in Table 13,
the probability of defect detection for defects passed from the
previous phase change by 6.17%, 9.35%,−2.40%, and 7.97%
for the Design, Implementation, Test, and Installation-and-
Checkout phases, respectively.
TABLE 13. Defect detection probability for the defects introduced in the
current phase excluding the two most significantly different opinions.
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR IDIPS-RPS APPLICATION
A sensitivity analysis for the IDiPS-RPS application was
performed by simultaneously excluding the most signifi-
cantly different estimations for ‘‘Attributes,’’ ‘‘Defect den-
sity,’’ and ‘‘Defect detection probability’’ nodes mentioned in
the previous sections. The results of the analysis are shown
in Tables 14 to 17. The defects introduced in each phase
changed by 5.28%, 0.53%, 3.58%, −22.24%, and −60.17%
for the Requirements, Design, Implementation, Test, and
Installation-and-Checkout phases, respectively, as shown
in Table 14. Tables 15 and 16 show the defect detection prob-
ability for defects introduced in each phase and passed from
the previous phase, respectively. While the mean of defect
detection probability in both cases changed by less than 10%,
the standard deviation was considerably reduced after elim-
TABLE 14. Defects introduced in the current phase of the IDIPS-RPS
application excluding two most significantly different opinions.
TABLE 15. Detection probability for defects introduced in the current
phase of the IDIPS-RPS application excluding two most significantly
different opinions.
TABLE 16. Detection probability for defects passed from the previous
phase of the IDIPS-RPS application excluding two most significantly
different opinions.
TABLE 17. Defects remaining in each phase of the IDIPS-RPS application
excluding two most significantly different opinions.
inating the two most divergent estimations. Table 17 shows
the number of defects remaining in each phase. The estimated
final number of defects in the IDiPS-RPS system decreased
from 9.89 to 7.53, and its standard deviation also decreased
from 13.19 to 7.92. However, it is notable that due to the
proprietary nature of the example software and its develop-
ment process, the number of defects remaining reported in
this study is based on limited information for demonstration
purpose only.
V. CONCLUSION
Since there are limited operating experience and data of NPP
software-related protection systems, one of the challenges of
the BBN model development is to systematically integrate
the available data required for constructing the BBN nodes
64566 VOLUME 6, 2018
S. J. Lee et al.: BBN Model Quantification
and quantifying the NPTs to assess the BBN model. In this
study, a framework was proposed which effectively integrates
expert opinions and other sources of evidence for NPT devel-
opment in order to quantify the number of software defects
and software reliability with less uncertainty. To adequately
accommodate the variability of experts’ opinion on the qual-
ity of NPP safety-related software when evaluating the BBN
model, distribution-based node probabilities were applied in
the NPT modeling in the BBN model. Especially, the variety
of the node probability values estimated from the experts
were aggregated and treated in an integrated manner by
deriving the best-fit probability distributions over the experts’
estimates on each BBN node.
In addition, in order to reduce the uncertainty caused by the
diverse experts’ opinions, other sources of evidence such as
software development data from literature acrossmany indus-
tries and the data for two NPP safety software development
projects were used to Bayesian update the D-NPTs related to
the defect density and defect detection probability. This study
also investigated an outlier treatment to conduct a sensitivity
study on the diverse node probability estimates provided by
different experts. The outlier-eliminated analysis provided a
smaller standard deviation for the number of defects remain-
ing in each phase excluding the most significantly different
estimations, which results in less uncertainty of software
reliability.
An essential characteristic of the proposed framework
includes establishing and quantifying the causal relationships
between the software development characteristics, estimating
the number of defects remaining, and the software failure
probability using expert opinion; probabilistically aggre-
gating multiple expert inputs; and utilizing literature data
and available development data to Bayesian update expert
inputs to reduce uncertainties introduced from expert opinion.
Future research is recommended to reduce the uncertainty
regarding the NPTs and to update the BBN model result for
software failure probability quantification with less uncer-
tainty. By increasing the number of experts in the elicitation,
uncertainty associated with the expert opinions on the BBN
parameters is expected to decrease, and so the standard
deviation for the number of defects remaining in each phase
is expected to decrease considerably. In addition, as more
evidence and observations from nuclear safety software oper-
ation experiences become available in the future, critical
parameters in the NPTs can be Bayesian updated to reduce
BBN NPT uncertainties further.
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